生長の家とは何だったのか？

ポツダム宣言

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Unconditional surrender—the victory theme of the U.S. and her Allies since 1943—was replaced last week by a more daring formula for ending the war with Japan. 

Loser's Choice. From Potsdam to Tokyo went a declaration (by the U.S., Britain and China) offering concrete, unalterable terms upon which Japan could end the war. The phrase "unconditional surrender" was still used. But it applied only to the armies in the field. The terms were for the nation. Their gist: 

¶ Defeated Japan could have industries, but not a war industry. 

¶ She could have a government, but not a government of militarists.

¶ She could have a home—the four main islands, and such little ones as the Allies might let her keep—but not a Greater East Asia. 

On some critical points the Potsdam declaration was deliberately incomplete: 

¶ The occupation of Japan need not follow the German pattern. But the declaration's promises to limit occupation to "points designated by the Allies" obviously could mean anything: Tokyo alone, or every city and hamlet in Japan. The significant provisions were that 1) there would be an occupation; 2) it would end as soon as Japan had effectively disarmed and had established a peaceful government. 

¶ All mention of the Emperor was omitted, possibly because the Allies are still debating what to do with him; possibly to suggest that his fate and that of the peculiar institution he represents will depend on how the throne's influence is exerted now. 

With iron logic, the declaration also described the only alternative: invasion and "the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland." All in all, the terms added up to a hard peace but not to a ruthless one. In population, living standards, sovereignty and trade, the Japan they envisioned would not be inferior to the Japan of two generations ago. 

Decline of a Slogan. The declaration was the work of a Big Three meeting. But it was not a Big Three document. It was, above all, a U.S. document. 

Chiang Kai-shek read it in Chungking and approved it. Winston Churchill worked on it and signed it in Potsdam while he was still Prime Minister; Clement Attlee, prudently included in the early Potsdam meetings, approved it before he had any authority to sign it. Joseph Stalin, nominally neutral in the Pacific war, did not sign the declaration, but he undoubtedly gave it a look and a nod. 

The signature that really counted was that of President Harry S. Truman, successor to unconditional surrender's principal advocate. How had a U. S. President come to ditch the guiding war principle of another President? The story of unconditional surrender's rise and decline was one of the most meaningful stories of World War II. 

For Want of Another. Franklin Roosevelt proposed, and Winston Churchill reluctantly accepted, unconditional surrender as the Allies' one & only offer to the enemy when the United Nations were much less united than they later became. That was at Casablanca in January 1943. Even then the British felt that some less rigid approach to Germany might have paid.

 

But unconditional surrender served one all-important purpose: it spiked every German effort to divide Russia and the Western Allies. Furthermore, it was a handy and possibly a necessary substitute for specific aims and terms, at a time when the Allies had no common aims beyond defeating the enemy. 

Experience demonstrated that unconditional surrender had more meaning as a slogan than as a practical rule at the point of victory. Italy's surrender was based on specific conditions (still secret). Even Germany's surrender, when victors and losers got down to cases at Reims and Berlin, entailed some immediate terms. 

The Japanese war was heading for a similar conclusion: the Potsdam declaration set forth terms that are conditions of surrender. By the time the declaration appeared, unconditional surrender was more a habit of thought — or an excuse for avoiding thought — than anything else. 

The Schools. But finding a more subtle and promising device was easier said than done. On aims, and on basic, long-range strategy in the Pacific, two schools of diplomats and military men were fighting their own war in Washington. Until recently, the cleavage cut through both the State and Navy Departments. 

Group No. 1, which included many naval and foreign service officers with experience in Japan, argued that much of Japan's strength came from conquered areas on the Asiatic mainland and the southern islands. This school argued that invasion of Japan proper might be both costly and inconclusive; it would be better just to pull Japan's teeth by liberating the conquered areas, leave Japan alone. (The fringe of this group put their fears of a war with Russia ahead of the actual war with Japan, wanted to preserve a counterbalance.)

Group No. 2 argued that Japan, even if she were stripped down to the home islands, would still be the only integrated, industrialized nation in the hemisphere between the Rockies and the Himalayas capable of waging large-scale modern war. This school therefore insisted on the indefinite occupation of Japan, with complete deindustrialization and reorganization of Japanese society. (The fringe of this group wanted to kill 70,000,000 Japs.) 

Most of this debate raged in off-the-record secrecy, keeping the names of the disputants from both the Japs and the U.S. public. But a corollary of the argument was a public spectacle: the row over what to do with the Emperor. Undersecretary of State Joseph C. Grew, long the none-too-clairvoyant U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo, was indelibly identified in most people's minds as a keep-the-Emperor man (although he insisted that his view was not so simple). 

Grew's longtime confidant and former Embassy counselor, Eugene H. Dooman, was also in the thick of things and had long since been marked down in Washington as a soft-peace man. Just how the Grew-Dooman school had fared in the 

Potsdam declaration would not be known until the meaning of some of its vaguer phrases and omissions was cleared up. 

Rivers of History. A few weeks ago, the mental and political logjam broke. It was as though the rivers of history had suddenly come to full flood and converged on a single point: an opportunity to win the war completely, yet end it soon, existed and ought to be exploited. There was nothing to lose; much might be gained. The pace of the war and a clearer understanding of its meaning largely quieted the battle in Washington. 

Those who were dubious of invasion's costs and rewards realized that Japan was being as thoroughly softened as any modern power could be. Those who staked everything on the complete reduction of Japan realized that in any case the most significant development of the war had utterly changed the face of the Orient: the U.S. was already, and unquestionably would continue to be, a power in Asia and the far Pacific. 

In great force, the U.S. was permanently installed on islands just off the Japanese coasts, and East Asia could never again be a one-power area. China's development, and Russia's emergence in Asia, double-riveted this certainty. 

The press burst into a rash of reports that Japan had submitted definite peace proposals. The reports were denied. But, playing up the denials, the press often obscured the vital fact: Japanese officialdom was thinking of peace, discussing the possibilities, and seeing to it that this state of mind was made known to Washington, Moscow, London. 

Schools in Tokyo. A flood of information—some good, some bad—poured into Allied capitals from Tokyo. According to the best of these accounts, carefully conveyed to Washington (and probably to watchful Moscow) through "a neutral channel": 

¶ The principal advocates of peace were the Admirals without a navy. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, an old-school "kimono liberal" and new Navy Minister, was their logical spokesman. 

¶ The politicians in Premier Kantaro Suzuki's Cabinet, which is dominated by the military, could see ruin's approach as well as anyone, and they too wanted peace. But they either would not or could not bid for it on any terms conceivably acceptable to the U.S. 

¶ General Kuniaki Koiso's Army faction, still stronger than any other, was the principal (and potent) bar to actual peace overtures. With facts to back them up, the Army men reasoned that despite everything they still had at least 5,000,000 men wellarmed, undefeated, and prepared to fight to the very last. 

The First Reaction. Nobody expected the Japanese to answer "Yes" as soon as they saw the Potsdam terms. Truman's statesmanlike move was intended to recapture the political initiative, not to win the war in an afternoon. 

Highly significant was publication of the message in Japanese newspapers. Perhaps still more significant was the fact that the Jap Cabinet met for two hours at Premier Suzuki's home to discuss the Potsdam declaration. Said Premier Suzuki, belying his own words: "So far as the Imperial Government of Japan is concerned, it will take no notice of this proclamation." 

The professional extremist, General Jiro Minami, head of the Political Association of Great Japan, also found the Potsdam terms "exactly contrary" to what he wanted. He scorned the offer, admitted Japan might be beaten. 

But the seed had been planted. It could not be overlooked by such Big Business spokesmen as Munitions Minister Teijiro Toyoda, a Mitsui man. The Potsdam declaration invited him and his friends to take a practical look at what would be left of their properties if the homeland was invaded. 

Job for a Zombie? At the least, the declaration was bound to widen war fissures in Japanese life and politics, encourage the groups who want a peace of survival. 

Ken Murayama, a Japanese newsman recently captured in the Philippines, thought that Japan was ripe for surrender. He said that the man picked to arrange it was an almost forgotten political zombie, Admiral and former Premier Keisuke Okada. 

In the 1936 young officers' revolt, sake-swilling Okada saved his life by attending his own funeral. His brother-in-law, murdered by mistake, was buried as Okada, and assassins stopped looking for the Premier. Okada politely thanked all who sent condolences, resigned as Premier, returned to his sake and his chrysanthemums. 

Later, if not now, some Jap like Okada would have to emerge and show Japan the way to the end. That man might remind the Japanese of one of their proverbs: "To be beaten is to win."

Does China have a secret plan to take America’s place?

Does China have a secret plan to take America’s place?

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/china-secret-plan-take-americas-place/

Does China have a secret plan to take America’s place?

February 25, 2015 at 6:25 PM EST

TRANSCRIPT

GWEN IFILL: Now to a controversial warning about China from a new bestselling book that’s becoming a lightning rod for criticism.

Chief foreign affairs correspondent Margaret Warner explains.

MARGARET WARNER: Since the 1970s, Michael Pillsbury has focused on China, as a Pentagon official and consultant and now at the conservative Hudson Institute.

Over the years, the Mandarin speaker has grown ever more hard-line in his views, and it is clear in his bestselling, but controversial new book, “The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower.”

He says it’s based on Chinese and American documents and books and conversations with Chinese military officials and defectors. Critics have shot back, accusing him of sloppy use of evidence.

I spoke with Pillsbury last week.

The very title of your book asserts that America has been in denial, that China has a secret strategy to replace the United States. What is that strategy based on?

MICHAEL PILLSBURY, Author, “The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower”: The strategy is based on two things, first, China’s historical role in what we would today call the leader of the world. They want to restore themselves to the role they played for 2,000 years.

The second part of the strategy is, they know from their economists that they can’t build China into a replacement for us by themselves. They have got to get certain things from the outside world, and they have worked very hard in the last 30 years to get those things.

MARGARET WARNER: And is that so surprising?

MICHAEL PILLSBURY: It’s surprising because they have denied publicly such an ambition.

They portray themselves as weak, backward, and in great need of assistance from us.

MARGARET WARNER: And the United States has been a very willing partner in assisting them.

MICHAEL PILLSBURY: Yes, because of false assumptions.

We thought, going back 30 or 40 years ago, if China becomes prosperous, the middle class will demand democracy, and so we’re looking at a country that, yes, was stronger, but it has our values. That didn’t happen. That’s what I call the greatest intelligence failure in our history.

MARGARET WARNER: But there are other countries in the world that consider themselves great historical powers and want to restore that greatness. What makes China, as you portray it, so malevolent or so inimical to UAEL PILLSBURY: I think it’s the unreformed China that I’m worried ab.S. interests?

MICHout.

They plan to keep the Communist Party structure, the approach to human rights, the approach to pollution. They plan to keep all that and become the dominant economic power. This is what I’m warning against.

MARGARET WARNER: But wasn’t it inevitable, given China’s size and its resources, its population, that it was bound to grow by leaps and bounds?  It didn’t need the United States for that.

MICHAEL PILLSBURY: No, they did need us from for that. It’s very clear from their own writings.

They believe that roughly half their growth over the last 30 years was brought about by favorable terms of trade and investment from America. We’re crucial to their strategy.

MARGARET WARNER: Now, you yourself made a personal evolution. You say you used to be what’s known in the trade as a panda hugger.

MICHAEL PILLSBURY: Yes.

Well, a panda hugger, that I was before, is someone who uncritically just wants to help and support China, has a sense of the old — what I call the old narrative. I came to realize I had been wrong from the beginning about who was really managing whom in this relationship. We have, I hate to say been their pawns because we have got a lot of benefit from our trade with China and our investment.

And they have made some enormous progress. But I think, overall, the Chinese are managing us much better than we are managing China.

MARGARET WARNER: Now, people who have looked at this book criticize it for relying way too much on the view of the hawks inside the defense and intelligence and military establishments, and that there are many other competing voices in the Chinese establishment.

Aren’t there?

MICHAEL PILLSBURY: Yes, that criticism is valid.

But the rise of the hawks has happened. It’s a fact. President Xi Jinping shows more attention to them, has involved them more in his deliberations, goes to meet with them in person. So, I think the rise of the hawks that I’m claiming has taken place is not up for debate. It’s happened for sure.

Other civilians are involved, too. It’s not just the military. They have a much more nationalistic view that China should speak out and really be something now, and not wait until 2049.

MARGARET WARNER: So, now, what would a Chinese-led global order look like that is detrimental to U.S. interests?

MICHAEL PILLSBURY: The Chinese concept of the new global order, they say in very pleasing language, will be fair. The south and the poor countries of the world, there will be no pressure anymore against dictators, that issues of a global nature, like climate change, pollution in general, these matters will be handled by consensus, not by pressure groups from what they perceive as, you know, unusual concern with American values. That will all be gone.

The key point about the new Chinese-led global order is America will not be a global leader. The removal of the United States as what they call the hegemon is the most important thing. So the new order itself is just going to have no American leadership. That’s the fundamental point.

MARGARET WARNER: There is a counterview, which is the U.S. and China are now the world’s two biggest economies, and if we enter into a period of conflict with them, we do so at our own peril.

MICHAEL PILLSBURY: Well, it’s true. We want to cooperate with China, but what I’m arguing is a little bit different.

I’m saying we need to be shaping China at the same time as they’re shaping us. They have enormous influence in our political system, with our businessmen. There’s no reason we can’t try to have the same kind of influence in Beijing.

MARGARET WARNER: So if the United States wants to forestall this, being replaced as the global superpower, what does it most need to do?

MICHAEL PILLSBURY: We need to strengthen organizations that are dedicated to shaping China.

We have to wake up that the Chinese are not poor and backward anymore, and it’s time to shape them. But, secondly, we are falling behind in almost all the competitiveness indicators there are. We have got to get our own house in order first, or the Chinese are going to win the marathon by default.

MARGARET WARNER: Michael Pillsbury, thank you.

サルトル

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Jean-Paul Sartre

Freedom fighter

The complete guide to France’s brainy hero

Feb 21st 2015  | From the print edition 

Sartre: A Philosophical Biography. By Thomas R. Flynn. Cambridge University Press; 436 pages; $39.95 and £30.

WHEN the French thinker and writer Jean-Paul Sartre died in April 1980, 50,000 people followed his hearse through Paris. It was a fitting tribute in a country where intellectual life is prized. Philosophers, though, are judged by their arguments, not their funerals. On that sterner test, how has Sartre’s philosophy held up? Thomas Flynn’s thorough new study offers expert guidance.

Most technical philosophers tend to look at the world as armchair scientists. They puzzle about time or knowledge, matter, numbers and chance. They ask how such things really are. Sartre, who also wrote bestselling fiction and plays, thought about the world as an off-duty novelist. He asked what the world was like for people. They were not detached physicists or passive observers. They lived, aided or obstructed by a material world, which included their bodies. For good or ill, they were thrown into contact with others. Sartre’s concern, in a phrase, was what it was like to be human. The topic sounded unmanageable. But its core elements were familiar enough: the mind, human values and human freedom. Sartre linked them together in big loose equations.

The human mind was free, notably in its imaginative capacity to entertain possibilities and think of the world as different from how it was. People were free of religious or ethical authorities, so obliged to find their own values. They were free finally to define themselves or choose a form of life as they pleased, for there was no human nature—nothing essential, that is—to being human. Those three freedoms added up to “existentialism”, an otherwise obscure label by which Sartre’s thought became known. How far it impresses you will depend on whether you prefer philosophy in careful, dry bits or in bold flashes that briefly light up a territory.

Sartre’s most famous philosophical treatise, “Being and Nothingness” (1943), suffered from trying to embed pointed insights into human thought and experience in a dense metaphysical theory that split not just mind from world but the mind of any one person from everyone else’s. In compensation, the book displayed Sartre’s rare psychological acuity and brought out the pervasive role of the imagination.

Sartre stressed an ever-present emotional element in human thinking that philosophers preoccupied with truth and validity tended to overlook. He was fertile and original in putting previously neglected mental phenomena such as shame, pride and fear at the centre of how to understand self-awareness. To cultural and gender studies he bequeathed the enticing idea that the judgmental look or predatory gaze of others shaped and commonly distorted a person’s sense of who they were.

In a typical twist, Sartre added that people were entirely free to reject the verdicts of others and their stereotyping. To deny that freedom involved self-deception or bad faith. So, generally, did blaming your situation on your past, your parents, the unconscious, social pressures or human nature. Those were craven excuses. At any moment you could avow or disavow your situation. Strictly, it was yours only once you claimed ownership. Such freedom was daunting, Sartre recognised. In his brutal phrase, everyone was “condemned” to be free.

In the philosopher’s superabundance of ideas, imagination did most of the work. Neither passive nor whimsical, this power of supposition underlay the simplest intentions and grandest plans. Its uses ran from the banal and domestic to the heroic and political. As the power to suppose that society might be different, imagination dominated Sartre’s radical politics. On Paris walls in the student upheavals of May 1968 appeared the Sartrean slogan, “Power to the imagination”.

Besides a weakness for overgeneralisation, Sartre tended to over-empower the mind. At one extreme, he was never far from gifting people with mysterious mental powers to shape events. His runaway prose tended to blur the simple point that picturing a better society did not create a better society. Imagination was needed for action but was never itself enough. People still had to act.

At another extreme, Sartre risked lapsing into stoical banalities. People had no protection, he admitted, against time, pain or death. They were still free, the philosopher insisted, to say what those ills meant to them. People were free to grant or deny value to life’s vicissitudes. How far, though, did refusing “ownership” of pain remove pain?

Sartre’s published output is reckoned at 20 pages a day throughout his working life. No English-speaking philosopher has read that vast corpus with greater industry than Mr Flynn. His new biography scrutinises the works chronologically from start to finish. It includes Sartre’s fiction and plays, as well as the political or critical essays. Mr Flynn has done Sartrean initiates a large service, but this is not an introduction.

Though he writes within Sartre’s thought, using his vocabulary, Mr Flynn stresses unresolved puzzles. Technical philosophers can sound as if they are trying to describe a world without humans, Sartre as if describing human life without a world. Sartre saw the difficulty, but never completed his later attempts to relocate the isolated mind of “Being and Nothingness” in a social world of rights and duties. Nor did he let up on the clash between limitless freedoms to change attitudes to a situation and their apparent powerlessness to change the situation itself. A cheery, can-do sort would say that life is not always so bleak. People are rarely or completely so trapped. No, indeed. But sometimes they are, which is one reason why Sartre’s work, though little read these days, remains interesting and even topical.

From the print edition: Books and arts 

Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York, said that President Obama did not love his country

Megyn Kelly Calls Out Rudy Giuliani: Are You Really Condemning Obama’s Patriotism? Kelly File

This is a rush transcript from "The Kelly File," February 19, 2015. This copy may not be in its final form and may be updated.

MEGYN KELLY, HOST: Breaking tonight, new outrage and backlash over an incendiary comment about the president of the United States by the man they call America's mayor.




Last night Rudy Giuliani, the man who led New York City through the 9/11 attacks, was speaking at a private dinner. In the audience was White House hopeful Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker and dozens of Republican big wigs.

Mayor Giuliani saying to the crowd, quote, "I do not believe, and I know this is a horrible thing to say, but I do not believe that the president loves America. He doesn't love you and he doesn't love me. He wasn't brought up the way you were brought up and I was brought up, through love of this country." The backlash was quick and it was harsh.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIPS)

RICK STENGEL, STATE DEPARTMENT'S UNDERSECRETARY: I'm just sorry to hear that and I -- I find it wrong in every possible way that can be wrong.

REP. DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, D-FLA., DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHAIR: A leader of the Republican Party said that the president doesn't love us and doesn't love the country. If the Republican Party really wants to be taken seriously, really wants to avoid its problems of the past, now is the time for its leaders to stop this kind of nonsense. Enough!

(LAUGHTER)

(END VIDEO CLIPS)

KELLY: The president's team also getting involved today. The Deputy White House Press Secretary Eric Schultz taking a shot at the mayor over his failed run for president saying, quote, "Mr. Giuliani test drove this line of attack during his fleeting 2007 run for the presidency. I agree with him on one thing, it was a horrible thing to say."

Here now to respond, former New York City mayor and former Republican presidential candidate, Rudy Giuliani. Mr. Mayor, do you want to apologize for your comments?

RUDY GIULIANI, FORMER NEW YORK CITY MAYOR: Not at all. I want to repeat it. The reality is I -- from all that I can see of this president, all that I've heard of him, he apologizes for America, he criticizes America. He talks about the crusades and how the Christians were barbarians, leaves out the second half of the sentence that the Muslims were barbarians also. He sees Christians slaughtered and doesn't stand up and hold a press conference although he holds a press conference for the situation in Ferguson. He sees Jews being killed for anti-Semitic reasons. He doesn't stand up and hold a press conference. This is an American president I've never seen before.

KELLY: But to say that he doesn't love America, I mean, that he could view foreign policy as a Democrat might view it and through a different lens than you or a Republican might see it. You can understand the differences between you. But to condemn his patriotism, to question his love of America?

GIULIANI: I'm not condemning his patriotism -- patriots can -- can criticize. They're allowed to criticize. I don't hear from him what I heard from Harry Truman, what I heard from Bill Clinton, what I heard from Jimmy Carter, which is these wonderful words about what a great country we are, what an exceptional country we are. When he called us an exceptional country, he said we're an exceptional country, but so is Greece.

KELLY: Yes.

GIULIANI: Back 3,000.

(CROSSTALK)

KELLY: That doesn't mean he doesn't love America.

GIULIANI: Well, I have a --

(CROSSTALK)

KELLY: A lot -- a lot of Liberals don't believe in American exceptionalism, but that doesn't mean they don't love America.

GIULIANI: Well, that I don't feel it. I don't feel it. I don't feel this love of America. I think this man was -- when I talked about his background, I'm talking about a man who grew up under the influence of Frank Marshall Davis who was a member of the communist party who he refers to over and over in his book, who was a tremendous critic of the United States.

This is a man who worked on Saul Alinsky who was a tremendous critic of the United States. I believe his initial approach is to criticize this country and then afterwards to say a few nice things about us.

KELLY: But when you say he wasn't raised to love America, I mean, he was raised in part by his grandparents, his - his grandfather served in World War II, his grandmother worked in ammunitions plant to help the nation during World War II. I mean, to suggest he was raised by people who don't love America, who don't -- didn't help him learn to love America.

GIULIANI: Well, his -- his grandfather introduced him to Frank Marshall Davis who was a communist who the president says.

(CROSSTALK)

KELLY: He fought in -- he fought in World War II!

GIULIANI: OK. You can fight in World War II and then you introduce someone to a communist and the young boy gets.

(CROSSTALK)

KELLY: It's a political world view. It's not a hatred for the country.

GIULIANI: Communism wasn't a hatred for America?

KELLY: I'm talking about this particular -- his grandfather, if he had a leftist view of how politics in the United States should run, does that mean he doesn't love America? Doesn't mean.

(CROSSTALK)

GIULIANI: Well, OK. Well, Kelly, how about being in a church of 17 years where the minister of the church says, "It's not God loves America but God damn America." Now, if you were in that church, wouldn't you quit that church?

KELLY: Let me ask you this.

GIULIANI: Wouldn't -- I'm going to ask you that? Would you quit that church?

(CROSSTALK)

KELLY: Well, listen. That is not -- it's not about me. But it's not -- it's not about me. But I want to ask you this because.

(CROSSTALK)

GIULIANI: But I know you would quit that church. And the reason you would is because you were brought up about how exceptional this country is, how wonderful this country is. I am saying, and I may be wrong, it's my opinion and I'm entitled to it.

KELLY: Yes.

GIULIANI: I do not detect in this man the same rhetoric and the same language, the same love of America that I detected in other American presidents including Democrats and I think it guides a lot of the things that he says and a lot of the things he does.

KELLY: Let me ask you this, so I mean, Debbie Wasserman Schultz is -- she's all upset about what she said.

(CROSSTALK)

GIULIANI: Well, she's always all upset.

KELLY: -- just for the record. She -- she didn't condemn Barack Obama when he called George W. Bush unpatriotic. She had no problem with that and she had said a lot of incendiary things.

(CROSSTALK)

GIULIANI: I did not -- did not call him unpatriotic.

KELLY: I know. But she -- she suggested you did. And she had an -- an issue with that.

GIULIANI: I did not.

KELLY: She -- Barack Obama actually did call George W. Bush unpatriotic. And Debbie Wasserman-Schultz had no problem with that. what I want to ask you thought because I have you here instead of her.

GIULIANI: OK.

KELLY: All right, is you went on Hannity's show back in 2007 when you were running and this back when General Petraeus was -- was testifying before Congress on the Iraq war and the surge and defending it. And MoveOn.Org had taken out an ad of the New York Times calling him "General Betray Us."

GIULIANI: Right.

KELLY: And you were upset about that. You had the following exchange. I want to ask you whether it still stands.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP, "HANNITY & COLMES," SEPT. 13, 2007)

HILLARY CLINTON, FORMER UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE: The reports that you provide to us really require the willing suspension of disbelief.

GIULIANI: It comes on the same day as the MoveOn.Org ad in the New York Times accusing General Petraeus of being a traitor, this is a despicable attack. Hillary Clinton should disown and condemn MoveOn.Org.

SEAN HANNITY, Co-HOST: You actually said these times call for statesmanship, not politicians spewing political venom.

GIULIANI: Yeah, you know, I mean, what -- what kind of civility is that?

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KELLY: And so I ask you the same thing, what kind of civility is that?

GIULIANI: I think that's perfectly civil. I think that is a perfectly reasonable opinion. But the president and his comments if we look at all his rhetoric has not displayed the kind of love of America, the kind of love of American exceptionalism that other American presidents have displayed. That he has gone abroad (ph) and criticized us over and over again, apologized for us. Every time he does it, it embarrasses me.

I was in Europe a lot this summer and this fall. And all I heard about is the bigoted American Police Departments and I never heard the president of the United States defend the policemen of America, 800,000 of which put their lives on the line for us.

KELLY: What about -- what about the critics who say you've hurt the GOP? Because now you've got some people coming out saying these Republicans, this is how they are. I mean, that's what Debbie Wasserman-Schultz, she wants Scott Walker to disavow your comments. She's -- she's the head of the DNC. But -- but do you think you hurt the Republican brand?

GIULIANI: I -- I -- I do not think I did. And last time all the candidates for president wanted me removed from office is when I fought the RICO case against teamsters union, the only one didn't reach (ph) was George Bush.

KELLY

Can American forces save Baghdad from falling to ISIS?

This is a rush transcript from "Hannity," February 13, 2015. This copy may not be in its final form and may be updated.



TUCKER CARLSON, GUEST HOST: Well, joining me now with reaction to all this, this fast moving-story, Fox News military analyst Colonel David Hunt, author of "Foreign and Domestic," retired brigadier general Tony Tata, and former Green Beret Benjamin Collins. Welcome to all three of you.



Colonel Hunt, I want to put up on the screen the overview, the picture as it stands at this hour of Iraq and Syria. Here are the areas -- they're in red, our viewers can see them -- in those two countries controlled or strongly influenced by ISIS. And if you can see it, it looks like metastasizing cancer. But it's really concentrated north of Baghdad, Mosul. I mean, it's just all over areas that were controlled until relatively recently by the United States.



How did this happen? What's the overview?



COL. DAVID HUNT, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FOX MILITARY ANALYST: Quick overview is that Qatar and Syria helped form ISIS to put a wedge in the insurgency in Syria. Qatar is rather duplicitous. And at the same time, Maliki, the prime minister of Iraq, fired all of the general officers and leaders down the major level in the army that we trained. And then a few ISIS soldiers came across -- terrorists came across the Syrian border, and five divisions worth of Iraqi military ran and left everything from tanks to drones to uniforms, to everything, $17 billion almost worth of gear was left.



And then the towns that ISIS took were full of money and banks. And they control, as you've pointed out, territory that's as big as Jordan, and an Iraqi military that's not capable, and now we're fighting again back there. For the 26th year, we're back in, bombing Iraq.



CARLSON: And so Ben Collins, here you have 320 Marines at this 25- mile-square base. And they're basically surrounded by ISIS, who are within close to striking distance. I mean, how can we rescue these guys if it came down to it? Are they as endangered as they seem to be?



BENJAMIN COLLINS, FMR. GREEN BERET: Certainly. Well, look, I think we've got an issue here. It seems like this administration, we always wait until it's almost at a point of crisis before we actually start to start, you know, generating a plan and actually get to this. I mean, the reality is, 320 surrounded by what, you know -- you know, 1,000, 2,000, 3,000? How quickly? I mean, it only takes about, you know, 20 to 30 minutes of these guys from al Baghdadi to actually get to this area.



CARLSON: Exactly.



COLLINS: So in terms of an actual rescue, you know, I think at this point, if those plans haven't been already put into place, I think it's probably a little bit, you know, too late for us to actually start moving things in quick order. So hopefully, we do have that capability on standby.



CARLSON: Well, General Tata, we're hearing from the Pentagon that plans are in place, that extraction -- you know, extraction methods are -- you know, have been devised and that these guys are safe, these 320 Marines. Do you think that's true? It seems like a perilous situation by definition.



BRIG. GEN. TONY TATA, U.S. ARMY (RET.): Well, I'm sure General Terry (ph) has plans in place and they've rehearsed those plans. So I'm quite confident that our forces have extraction plans.



The bigger issue here is a complete lack of engagement of this administration throughout the region that has resulted in this kind of thing. ISIS is going after every means of nation-state capability that they can, leveraging their elements of power. And they're growing rapidly across the region. Around the world, they're recruiting heavily and they're being successful at it.



And they've shown a very sophisticated strategic capability, as well as very sophisticated tactical capability to be able to train, man, equip and field an army that can breach the wire with sophisticated tactics on one of the airbases that we're using in this campaign. And so it's not really a discussion about rescue, it's a discussion about what's our campaign to destroy this enemy.



CARLSON: But I mean, the picture, Colonel Hunt, if you take three steps back, is one of awesome and profound weakness! Here the United States controlled this entire country, influenced the region overwhelmingly up until really recently, and now we're worried about the fate of 320 men, American Marines, on a lowly outpost.



I mean, this -- the picture to the rest of the world is one of American impotence, isn't it?



HUNT: No, it's not.



CARLSON: It is!



HUNT: That's just not -- that's -- that's not true. Look, the United States of America has been leading the fight on terrorism for 14 years.



CARLSON: Right.



HUNT: Everybody (INAUDIBLE) 14 years. Nobody in the world has done what we have in this. And everybody's now yelling to do more in Iraq. And my problem is, what do you want to do? Because we've got 3,000 soldiers on the ground, which is not enough. We're going to -- if you want us to go in, that's another 20,000 to 30,000 guys. And there's only one other military in the Middle East that even can get close to this, and that's Israel and they're not coming in. So all the noise I keep hearing about we're not doing enough -- what do you want? Because the first word out of everybody's mouth...



CARLSON: Whoa, whoa, whoa! Hold on!



(CROSSTALK)



HUNT: There's no boots on the ground!



CARLSON: I'm with you entirely...



(CROSSTALK)



HUNT: And how do you do it without it?



(CROSSTALK)



CARLSON: What happens when Baghdad is in imminent danger...



HUNT: What do you want to do?



CARLSON: I don't know! I'm asking you. Do you let it fall?



HUNT: That's 30,000 soldiers that's invading Iraq, and we're back at war for the 26th year. The problem with this is, we can't -- we've been doing it for 14 years, killing them. We've been bombing them for 26. It is not working. And now we got some other things that happened, and we want to do it again. And we got 350 (sic) Marines at a base they cannot secure. It's impossible for them to do it be we haven't got enough there.



CARLSON: I want to pull Ben Collins in here. So what -- I mean...



COLLINS: With all due respect to Colonel Hunt...



CARLSON: What is the answer? If Baghdad is in danger of falling, what do we do?



COLLINS: Certainly. So if we have a problem is that's we've never really -- we don't follow through. So we pulled out of Iraq...



CARLSON: Of course not.



COLLINS: ... without -- so we don't follow through. And look, the reality is, this president has not come up with a solution for ISIS because he can't come up with a solution for Syria. And if you can't come up with a solution to Syria, you have to take into account Iran.



CARLSON: Right.



COLLINS: And this president has made it very clear that the one thing that he wants more than anything is to sign this nuclear deal with Iran, which ties his hands with Syria, which ties our hands with ISIS. So we've shown that we're not going to have a strategic plan. What can we do? We can re-engage with those Sunni tribes that we had, that allowed for the -- you know, the great awakening 2007, right? We can engage countries like Turkey. But Turkey would be a great...



HUNT: Turkey's not coming in!



COLLINS: Yes, why -- why isn't...



HUNT: Turkey's not coming in!