生長の家とは何だったのか？

How to Deter China２

DETERRENCE THROUGH DENIAL

If Washington wants to change Beijing’s calculus, it must deny China the ability to control the air and the sea around the first island chain, since the PLA would have to dominate both arenas to isolate the archipelago. The United States must also integrate allied battle networks and strengthen allied capabilities—both of which will help offset the PLA’s efforts to destabilize the region’s military balance. By and large, those goals can be achieved with ground forces, which would not replace existing air and naval forces but complement them.


When it comes to air defenses, states along the first island chain could buttress their ability to deny China access to airspace by employing army units equipped with highly mobile and relatively simple short-range interceptor missiles (such as the Evolved Sea Sparrow, supported by GIRAFFE radar systems to detect targets). The U.S. Army, meanwhile, along with such allies as Japan, could operate more sophisticated, longer-range systems capable of intercepting Chinese cruise missiles and destroying advanced Chinese aircraft. Although not part of the first island chain, Vietnam is already enhancing its air-denial capabilities and could contribute to a larger defense effort.


Then there is the task of denying the PLA the sea control it would need to mount offensive operations against the islands. Senior members of Congress have encouraged the U.S. Army to consider resurrecting an artillery force for coastal defense, a mission it abandoned after World War II. The idea is simple and compelling. Rather than risk sending warships within range of PLA defenses or diverting submarines from higher-priority missions, the United States and its allies could rely on ground forces, based along the first island chain and armed with mobile launchers and antiship cruise missiles, to perform the same operations. Japan’s military has done exactly that, placing shore-based antiship cruise missile units on some of the Ryukyu Islands during military exercises. Vietnam has fielded similar systems. And other frontline states could follow suit, either independently or with U.S. funding, training, and technical assistance.



Washington must convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force.

Another mission to which U.S. and allied ground forces could contribute is naval mine warfare. Traditionally, naval ships lay and clear mines to restrict or allow transit through narrow seas and straits. Although clearing mines will remain an inherently naval function, ground forces could play a larger role in laying them, particularly if stationed near the key straits that link the East China and South China Seas to the open oceans. Armed with the ability to emplace sea mines from land bases using short-range rockets, helicopters, or barges, U.S. and allied ground forces could make large stretches of sea off-limits to the Chinese navy. Minefields at key chokepoints along the first island chain would greatly complicate a Chinese naval offensive and hamper China’s ability to harass allied naval forces. Nearby coastal antiship missile batteries, meanwhile, could make mine-clearing operations risky for PLA ships.


Over the long run, ground forces could also support operations against the PLA’s growing submarine force. A submarine relies heavily on its stealth for defense; once noticed, it must evade contact or assume a high risk of destruction. By placing low-frequency and acoustic sensors in the water around the first island chain, U.S. and allied forces could augment their ability to detect the presence of PLA submarines. Coastal artillery units could then use rocket-launched torpedoes to induce oncoming submarines to abandon their missions and retreat.


If China invaded a U.S. ally or partner, even a small number of U.S. ground troops could help local forces mount a determined resistance. Modern conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East have demonstrated what a modest irregular ground force can achieve with the help of modern weapons and capable advisers. Thanks to U.S. advisers and airpower, an overmatched South Vietnamese army was able to withstand a full-scale assault by North Vietnamese forces in 1972. Nearly three decades later, in 2001, a small contingent of U.S. Special Forces, backed by strike aircraft, helped Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance defeat the Taliban. And in 2006, Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, with the assistance of Iranian advisers, fought the Israeli Defense Forces to a standstill for a month. A similar effort by U.S. ground forces in the Pacific could make seizing and occupying territory an extremely costly proposition for China, especially if local forces also had advanced training and equipment. Access to short-range, precision-guided mortars, rockets, and shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles, for example, would maximize the lethality of small guerrilla resistance units.


By shouldering greater responsibility for denying the PLA the air and sea control it needs to mount offensive operations, ground forces could liberate U.S. and allied air and naval forces to perform the missions only they can accomplish, such as long-range surveillance and air strikes. Should deterrence fail, these air and naval assets would prove critical to defending the first island chain and offsetting PLA advantages. For example, the PLA can concentrate forces at any point along the first island chain far more rapidly than can the United States and its allies, whose militaries are more widely distributed. And it doesn’t have to reconcile conflicting national interests. (In the wake of a Chinese offensive against a single island, countries along the chain would likely want to keep their forces in place to defend their homelands.) By reducing the demands on U.S. air and naval forces for such missions as air and sea denial, ground forces would enable these air and naval forces to stand in reserve, ready to move quickly to defend a threatened link in the chain.


To be successful, a policy of deterrence also needs to have a credible threat of retaliation after the fact, and here, too, ground forces could help. At present, the U.S. weapons that can launch a precise retaliatory strike are located on increasingly vulnerable forward air bases and aircraft carriers. The Pentagon plans to address this problem in part by building new submarines and long-range stealth bombers, but the cost of such hardware is high, especially given their relatively modest payloads. Ground forces, by comparison, may offer a cheaper way to provide additional firepower. Unlike air and naval forces, ground forces do not need to return to distant bases in order to rearm. They can store far more munitions than even the largest bomber or warship, and they can place them in hardened bunkers that are better shielded from attack.


Moreover, in the event of a conflict, the PLA would benefit from a particularly asymmetric advantage: its large force of land-based intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States, as a signatory to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, cannot deploy these systems. Yet by equipping ground forces with comparatively inexpensive missiles that conform to the treaty’s range limitations, and by positioning them forward along the first island chain to reduce the cost associated with delivering missiles over extended ranges, Washington and its allies could go a long way toward fixing the imbalance at a relatively low cost. And if ground troops could not physically maneuver rapidly enough to respond to a breach in the island chain’s defenses, those nearby could quickly respond by concentrating their missile fire on the threatened area.


Perhaps the first island chain’s greatest vulnerability is the U.S. battle network—the critical systems that handle everything from directing and tracking troops and supplies to guiding weapons. This network currently relies heavily on satellites and nonstealth unmanned aerial vehicles, both of which the PLA could target. The best way to reduce that risk would be to establish a communications network of fiber-optic cables buried beneath the ground and the seabed along the chain, allowing disparate forces to safely receive and transmit data from hardened command centers on land. Island-based air defense and sea-denial forces, as well as antiship minefields, could protect the cable lines running between the islands.


THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE

As with any operational concept, Archipelagic Defense faces hurdles. Two of the most prominent are fiscal and geopolitical: the prospective cost and the willingness of states along the first island chain to cooperate. But despite the price tag of a new posture, the defense community in the United States is beginning to realize that current projected cuts in the Pentagon’s defense budget do not square with today’s increasingly dangerous security environment. The National Defense Panel, a bipartisan group of U.S. defense experts, recently recommended that the Obama administration and Congress restore defense spending to the levels projected in the Pentagon’s original budget for fiscal year 2012. Adopting that recommendation would substantially increase the Pentagon’s resources over the next decade.


The Pentagon can also make the argument that investing in Archipelagic Defense could yield future returns beyond the western Pacific. For example, the so-called AirLand Battle concept, which was developed in the 1970s and helped deter a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO, succeeded not only in central Europe; the United States and its allies also relied on it, in modified form, during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War. Similarly, the Pentagon could employ many of the capabilities associated with Archipelagic Defense to defend other critical regions, including allies and partners near the Persian Gulf and the Baltic Sea.


If the Defense Department cannot secure budget increases, it can still make changes to better match its overall posture to the current security environment. To cite but one example, the Pentagon still earmarks a significant number of ground forces to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack. Yet a large-scale invasion is unlikely; the greater threat is that Pyongyang could launch a strike with missiles armed with nuclear or chemical warheads. In any event, South Korea has a population that is twice as large as its enemy’s and a per capita income that is more than 15 times as large. Seoul can and should shoulder a greater portion of the burden of its own defense against a traditional ground invasion.


Even with the right resources, dealing with a welter of regional allies and partners will undoubtedly prove challenging. U.S. ground forces would have to play different roles depending on the country. Japan, with formidable capabilities of its own, could bolster its ground defenses without much U.S. support. By contrast, U.S. ground forces would probably need to take on a larger role in the Philippines. In both countries, a greater U.S. ground presence would provide a level of assurance that air and maritime forces, which can be quickly withdrawn, cannot. Taiwan, meanwhile, given the absence of diplomatic relations with the United States, would have to act with little or no assistance.


Several countries, Japan and Vietnam in particular, have already suggested that they are serious about fielding the kind of robust defenses that would be required for Archipelagic Defense. Other states beyond the first island chain, including Australia and Singapore, appear inclined to provide basing and logistical support. But just as it took NATO well over a decade to establish a formidable conventional deterrent to the Warsaw Pact, the United States and its allies cannot establish Archipelagic Defense overnight.


Committing to the strategy now would have the advantage of allowing Washington and its friends to spread the expense of fielding such forces over time. In the meantime, given the region’s ongoing military competition, the United States and its allies along the first island chain must make a persistent, sustained effort to preserve regional stability and prosperity. Of course, Archipelagic Defense would provide no more of a panacea against all forms of Chinese aggression than NATO’s conventional deterrent solved the problems once posed by Moscow’s wars of national liberation and nuclear buildup. But establishing such a posture would represent an essential—and long-overdue—first step in counterbalancing China’s revisionist ambitions.

How to Deter China

How to Deter China

The Case for Archipelagic Defense


By Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.


From our March/April 2015 Issue

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143031/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-deter-china

In the U.S. military, at least, the “pivot” to Asia has begun. By 2020, the navy and the air force plan to base 60 percent of their forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Pentagon, meanwhile, is investing a growing share of its shrinking resources in new long-range bombers and nuclear-powered submarines designed to operate in high-threat environments.

These changes are clearly meant to check an increasingly assertive China. And with good reason: Beijing’s expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as “the first island chain,” encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt Washington’s ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism, Washington’s goal, and that of its allies and partners, should be to achieve deterrence through denial—to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force.


Leveraging the latent potential of U.S., allied, and partner ground forces, Washington can best achieve this objective by establishing a series of linked defenses along the first island chain—an “Archipelagic Defense”—and, in so doing, deny Beijing the ability to achieve its revisionist aims through aggression or coercion.


THE RISKS OF REVISIONISM


China wants to slowly but inexorably shift the regional military balance in its favor.

China claims that its rise is intended to be peaceful, but its actions tell a different story: that of a revisionist power seeking to dominate the western Pacific. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over not only Taiwan but also Japan’s Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) and most of the 1.7 million square miles that make up the East China and South China Seas, where six other countries maintain various territorial and maritime claims. And it has been unapologetic about pursuing those goals. In 2010, for example, China’s then foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, dismissed concerns over Beijing’s expansionism in a single breath, saying, “China is a big country, and other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact.”


Consider Beijing’s recent bullying in the South China Sea. In March 2014, Chinese coast guard boats blocked the Philippines from accessing its outposts on the Spratly Islands. Two months later, China moved an oil rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, clashing with Vietnamese fishing boats. The moves echoed earlier incidents in the East China Sea. In September 2010, as punishment for detaining a Chinese fishing boat captain who had rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels, China temporarily cut off its exports to Japan of rare-earth elements, which are essential for manufacturing cell phones and computers. And in November 2013, China unilaterally declared an “air defense identification zone,” subject to its own air traffic regulations, over the disputed Senkaku Islands and other areas of the East China Sea, warning that it would take military action against aircraft that refused to comply.


Some have suggested that as its military grows stronger and its leaders feel more secure, China will moderate such behavior. But the opposite seems far more likely. Indeed, Beijing’s provocations have coincided with the dramatic growth of its military muscle. China is now investing in a number of new capabilities that pose a direct challenge to regional stability. For example, China’s People’s Liberation Army is bolstering its so-called anti-access/area-denial capabilities, which aim to prevent other militaries from occupying or crossing vast stretches of territory, with the express goal of making the western Pacific a no-go zone for the U.S. military. That includes developing the means to target the Pentagon’s command-and-control systems, which rely heavily on satellites and the Internet to coordinate operations and logistics. The PLA has made substantial progress on this front in recent years, testing an antisatellite missile, using lasers to blind U.S. satellites, and waging sophisticated cyberattacks on U.S. defense networks.


China is also enhancing its capacity to target critical U.S. military assets and limit the U.S. Navy’s ability to maneuver in international waters. The PLA already has conventional ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike major U.S. facilities in the region, such as the Kadena Air Base, in Okinawa, Japan, and is developing stealth combat aircraft capable of striking many targets along the first island chain. To detect and target naval vessels at greater distances, the PLA has deployed powerful radars and reconnaissance satellites, along with unmanned aerial vehicles that can conduct long-range scouting missions. And to stalk U.S. aircraft carriers, as well as the surface warships that protect them, the Chinese navy is acquiring submarines armed with advanced torpedoes and high-speed cruise missiles designed to strike ships at long distances.


Beijing’s actions cannot be explained away as a response to a U.S. arms buildup. For the last decade, Washington has focused its energy and resources primarily on supporting its ground troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. defense budget, which until recently stood at above four percent of the country’s GDP, is projected to decline to less than three percent by the end of the decade. Simply put, the Pentagon is shedding military capabilities while the PLA is amassing them.


Yet if the past is prologue, China will not seek to resolve its expansionist aims through overt aggression. Consistent with its strategic culture, it wants to slowly but inexorably shift the regional military balance in its favor, leaving the rest of the region with little choice but to submit to Chinese coercion. For the most part, China’s maritime neighbors are convinced that diplomatic and economic engagement will do little to alter this basic fact. Several of them, including Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are increasingly focusing their militaries on the task of resisting Chinese ambitions. They know full well, however, that individual action will be insufficient to prevent Beijing from carrying its vision forward. Only with U.S. material support can they form a collective front that deters China from acts of aggression or coercion.


Obama vs. Netanyahu: Why the future of Israel is at stake２

Obama vs. Netanyahu: Why the future of Israel is at stake?

(CROSSTALK)



HANNITY: ... In the sunset years...



DERMER: Well, that -- that's our disagreement, that we believe that the path that they're taking will pave the way for Iran to get that nuclear weapon and not block it. They believe...



HANNITY: All right...



DERMER: ... that it's going to block it. And that's really the debate. It's a policy disagreement. It's not personal. And I wouldn't throw (ph) any historical analogy. The prime minister just feels that he needed to make his case about his concerns for this deal in the hope that people would listen to what he has to say, and hopefully, you'll get a much better deal. That's what he was arguing for in Congress.



HANNITY: All right, thank you so much, Ambassador, for being with us.  Appreciate it.



Joining us now is former Israeli ambassador and historian Dore Gold.  Ron is talking about -- the ambassador is talking about a policy disagreement, but it is one, Ambassador, that could have profound implications! You know, the last century, we lost 100 million souls, give or take a million or so here and there. That's a lot of people. I think people forget evil in our time and that we have to be so ever vigilant.  The prime minister said never again.



Why do I believe the mullahs in their desire to wipe Israel off the map and destroy America?



DORE GOLD, FMR. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES: Well, you know, the statements of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are not just his statements.  They are repeated by the entire Iranian leadership. If you look at the statements of the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, if you look at the statements of other leading officials in Iran, they all call for the destruction of Israel in one way or another.



They even put the statements about destroying Israel on placards, on billboards which they attach to missile carriers carrying the Shaab-3 (ph) missile that can hit Israel. So they are juxtaposing their hostile intentions with their growing capabilities. And that is why Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu has to be so careful and pay very close attention to what Iran is doing because the stakes are the future of the Jewish state.



HANNITY: Again, I go back to -- and the prime minister mentioned this in his speech this week, that even as they are negotiating, and apparently yelling at John Kerry and the Iranians had to be told to stop yelling at John Kerry -- and even the Iranians are rejecting this deal that would ultimately give them nuclear weapons.



There was footage taken from an Iranian naval exercise off the coast of the Straits of Hormuz. And what does it show? It shows Iran practicing the destruction of a U.S. Navy carrier while negotiations are going on! I don't think I'd be negotiating with people if they were acting in that manner.



GOLD: That mock carrier is an imitation or a kind of model of the U.S. Nimitz. So they have a very specific idea of who they want to target.  Now, what are they trying to do here? They're trying to build good will with the American people, with the Obama administration, and that's called good will by showing that their navy has a missile that can take out a carrier? I think something's very wrong here.



And if you want to negotiate with Iran, you've got to make sure Iran makes three fundamental changes -- stop aggression against Iran's neighbors like the countries of the Gulf, stop support...



HANNITY: Well...



GOLD: ... for international terrorism, and stop calling for the annihilation of Israel. Those are reasonable diplomatic demands.



HANNITY: Reason -- it's -- it's a -- it's a prerequisite. It's common sense. One thing the prime minister also said -- and he was very, very clear. He talked about never again and he also said that Israel reserves the right to act alone. We see how the Jordanians and the Egyptians are acting to -- against ISIS. Could we possibly see a coalition that maybe was unfathomable a decade or two ago, and that being Egypt and Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Israel stopping the Iranian nuclear program?



GOLD: Well...



HANNITY: Because the prime minister was clear that he would act alone if necessary.



GOLD: Yes, we do see similar perceptions between Israel and the Arab states. Just two-and-a-half weeks ago, Sean, I was in Europe -- I can't say where -- with a group of a lot of ex-military from the Arab states. I sat with a general from the Iraqi army, who is a Sunni. And what does he tell me? The Iranians at the end of December allowed over a million Iranians to cross the Iraqi border and take part in what's called a Shura festival, and they came without passports, without visas, and the Iraqis have no idea if the Iranians are going to leave.



HANNITY: All right...



GOLD: In Yemen, we see their penetration becoming much deeper. They are moving through the whole Middle East. The Arab see Iran the same way we do.



HANNITY: Listen, Yemen -- the president was wrong. Somalia, he's been wrong. Libya, he's been wrong. Iraq, he's been wrong. ISIS was the JV team. Afghanistan, he's been wrong. If he's wrong here, though, the consequences are indescribable.



Thank you, sir. Ambassador, good to see you again. Thank you for being with us.



GOLD: Good to be with you.

Obama vs. Netanyahu: Why the future of Israel is at stake

Obama vs. Netanyahu: Why the future of Israel is at stake?

http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/hannity/transcript/2015/03/09/obama-vs-netanyahu-why-future-israel-stake

This is a rush transcript from "Hannity," March 6, 2015. This copy may not be in its final form and may be updated.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIPS)

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: We think it's a mistake for the prime minister of any country to come to speak before Congress a few weeks before they're about to have an election. It makes it look like we are taking sides.

ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU: The remarkable alliance between Israel and the United States has always been above politics. It must always remain above politics!

OBAMA: I think that it's been a distraction.

NETANYAHU: Israel is grateful for the support of America's people and of America's presidents, from Harry Truman to Barack Obama.

OBAMA: I did not have a chance to watch Prime Minister Netanyahu's speech. I did have a chance to take a look at the transcript. And as far as I can tell, there was nothing new.

NETANYAHU: To let Iran get nuclear weapons would be to win the battle but lose the war. We can't let that happen!

OBAMA: On the core issue, which is how do we prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the prime minister didn't offer any viable alternatives.

NETANYAHU: This is a bad deal. It doesn't block Iran's path to the bomb, it paves Iran's path to the bomb.

OBAMA: I have repeatedly said that I would rather have no deal than a bad deal. Even military action would not be as successful as the deal that we have put forward.

NETANYAHU: Now we're being told that the only alternative to this bad deal is war. That's just not true. The alternative to this bad deal is a much better deal!

(END VIDEO CLIPS)

SEAN HANNITY, HOST: And welcome to this special edition of "Hannity," "Obama vs. Netanyahu."

Now, earlier this week, the Israeli prime minister warned lawmakers during a joint session of Congress about what would happen if Iran ever got its hands on a nuclear weapon, but it seemed to fall on deaf ears with this administration.

For reaction now, we bring in Israeli ambassador to the United States -- Ron Dermer is with us. Sir, thanks for being with us.

RON DERMER, ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES: Good to be with you.

HANNITY: This to me is a defining moment of our time. This is France and Great Britain in Munich in 1938. And I'll tell you why, Ambassador.  One plus one equals two. Radical Islamists sworn to destroy Israel and the United States fighting proxy wars on five continents coupled with nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, could equal a modern-day holocaust.

I agree with the prime minister. I assume you do, as well.

DERMER: Yes, I do. And the prime minister said in his speech to Congress that the greatest danger facing our world is the marriage of militant Islam with nuclear weapons. And that's why in one of the clips you showed, he said it's very important to defeat ISIS. And these are barbarians -- savage barbarians that have to be defeated.

But to defeat ISIS and to leave Iran as a nuclear power would be to win the battle and to lose the war, as you said, just because of how dangerous this could be. And we're very concerned that a deal that is being negotiated right now would in a very short amount of time, maybe in - - within the next 10 years, Iran would only have about a year where they could break out to get to a weapon. And they've cheated in the past. And they've defied inspectors in the past, so they could do it.

But what's even worse, as the prime minister said, Iran could get to the bomb not simply by violating the deal that's being negotiated, but they could get to the bomb by keeping it, by simply waiting 10 years when all the restrictions on their nuclear program, the special restrictions that would put in place by this deal -- when all those restrictions would be removed, when all the sanctions would be removed, and then Iran would be free and clear, and within a very short distance of not having a single bomb but an entire nuclear arsenal. That's why this deal is a very bad deal.

HANNITY: The prime minister went out of his way, I thought, to be very gracious to the president, talked about the long history that the United States and Israel have together as allies and partners.

But Israel is being kept in the dark in terms of what the details of this deal are. But we hear about the sunset clause, that in a 10-year period of time, there would be pretty much a seal of approval given to Iran that they could actually enrich the uranium. And of course, now we have to talk about the delivery systems which would then give them the bomb and the delivery system to get it to Israel and maybe the United States.

What do we know for sure about this deal as it is currently being negotiated? And have you been left out of the very specific points of the deal? Meaning has Israel been left out?

DERMER: Look, we're not in the dark, Sean. I can tell you with certainty that we know what's being offered on the table. But the prime minister spoke about things that are a matter of public record that you can Google.

You mentioned the sunset clause, and for viewers who don't understand what that means, the deal that is being negotiated would within a certain number of years remove the restrictions, the special restrictions that are going to be put in place in Iran's nuclear program, and then they'd be treated like any other country in the world, like Japan today. And Japan has an industrial enrichment capability.

But the problem was, we could have an Iran that would not be like Japan is today, led by a Shinzo Abe, but like Japan was -- the regime the Japan had 70 years ago. That's the danger. And what's why the prime minister made very clear -- and this was new about his speech and a lot of people maybe did not see it. What the prime minister said is that you have to link the removal of those restrictions on Iran's nuclear program to a change in Iran's behavior. They have to stop their aggression in the region. They have to stop terrorism...

HANNITY: All right, well...

DERMER: ... around the world...

HANNITY: OK...

DERMER: ... and they have to stop threatening to annihilate Israel.  And if they do that, if they act like a normal country, then they can be treated like a normal country.

HANNITY: All right, but let's look at their history because we have a history. We have their supreme leader -- I'll put it up on the screen, where he called Israel a cancerous tumor that must be uprooted. Or the time that said that -- he called Israel a rabid dog. Or the time that he said that Israelis are not humans. Or Ahmadinejad saying that he calls for a world without the United States and Israel. Or the time he called for the end of the U.S. and Israel.

There's a long history here. I have video of the Iranians repeatedly burning American flags! That's the -- right there, that's the 1979 hostages held 444 days -- or the Iranians burning American and Israeli flags, which happens quite often.

With that history and stated goal of annihilating Israel, wiping it off the map, and the same with the United States, my first question is -- they've cheated so often, why would we even sit at the negotiating table with them? I'm frankly embarrassed that our president is doing that.

DERMER: Look, Sean, the P5-plus-1, the leading powers of the world, are negotiating with Iran. Israel does not have a vote in that negotiation. And I can assure you that if Israel had a vote, they would be taking a much harder line than they're taking now.

But Israel does have a voice. And the reason why we have a voice is because we have a state, the Jewish people have a state, founded in 1948, where we can speak out. And the prime minister spoke out in a way that only he can about how dangerous it is.

And you're quite right, it's not just a danger to Israel. It's not just a danger to the Jewish people, Iran, any more than the Nazis were only a danger to the Jews. The Nazis killed six million Jews, but because of them, 60 million people around the world were killed in World War II.

So this is a threat to Israel, it's a threat to the region, it's a threat to the world. And I'll tell you, Sean, when Israelis and Arabs are saying the same thing, people should pay attention. That's the ultimate no-spin zone.

HANNITY: You know, we have in the corner of our screen there -- we're saying "Obama vs. Netanyahu." And then we also put in there "Chamberlain versus Churchill." I see the prime minister -- I see this as -- I see a great analogy here. In other words, the threat of a modern-day holocaust if these radical Islamists and mullahs of Iran get these weapons that they so desire, I see the chance of that happening. It reminds me of somebody like Churchill, who took the time and read "Mein Kampf," understood the mind and the ambitions of somebody like Hitler. He was a voice in the wilderness.

I see the prime minister as a modern-day Churchill, a voice in the wilderness, and I see President Obama as a modern-day Chamberlain and appeaser! I feel like he doesn't understand the danger, can't even say that ISIS is Islamic or talk about radical Islamists. Why?

DERMER: Look, I wouldn't say that, and I don't want to characterize the president. I'm sure that the president and the secretary of state -- they want to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. No one in the White House wants to see Iran having a nuclear weapon. We have a policy disagreement...

HANNITY: But this agreement...

ネタニヤフ演説批判

Mr. Netanyahu’s Unconvincing Speech to Congress

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/opinion/netanyahu-israel-unconvincing-iran-speech-to-congress.html?_r=0

By THE EDITORIAL BOARDMARCH 3, 2015

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel could not have hoped for a more rapturous welcome in Congress. With Republicans and most Democrats as his props, he entered the House of Representatives to thunderous applause on Tuesday, waving his hand like a conquering hero and being mobbed by fawning lawmakers as he made his way to the lectern.

Even Washington doesn’t often see this level of exploitative political theater; it was made worse because it was so obviously intended to challenge President Obama’s foreign policy.

Mr. Netanyahu’s speech offered nothing of substance that was new, making it clear that this performance was all about proving his toughness on security issues ahead of the parliamentary election he faces on March 17. He offered no new insight on Iran and no new reasons to reject the agreement being negotiated with Iran by the United States and five other major powers to constrain Iran’s nuclear program.

His demand that Mr. Obama push for a better deal is hollow. He clearly doesn’t want negotiations and failed to suggest any reasonable alternative approach that could halt Iran’s nuclear efforts.

Moreover, he appeared to impose new conditions, insisting that international sanctions not be lifted as long as Iran continues its aggressive behavior, including hostility toward Israel and support for Hezbollah, which has called for Israel’s destruction.

Mr. Netanyahu has two main objections. One is that an agreement would not force Iran to dismantle its nuclear facilities and would leave it with the ability to enrich uranium and, in time, to produce enough nuclear fuel for a bomb. Two, that a deal to severely restrict Iran’s ability to produce nuclear fuel for a decade or more is not long enough. He also dismisses the potential effectiveness of international inspections to deter Iran from cheating.

While an agreement would not abolish the nuclear program, which Iran says it needs for power generation and medical purposes, neither would walking away. Even repeated bombing of Iran’s nuclear plants would not eliminate its capability because Iran and its scientists have acquired the nuclear know-how over the past six decades to rebuild the program in a couple of years.

The one approach that might constrain Iran is tough negotiations, which the United States and its partners Britain, France, China, Germany and Russia have rightly committed to. If an agreement comes together, it would establish verifiable limits on the nuclear program that do not now exist and ensure that Iran could not quickly produce enough weapons-usable material for a bomb. The major benefit for Iran is that it would gradually be freed of many of the onerous international sanctions that have helped cripple its economy.

While no Iranian facilities are expected to be dismantled, critical installations are expected to be reconfigured so they are less of a threat and the centrifuge machines used to enrich uranium would be reduced. Iran would be barred from enriching uranium above 5 percent, the level needed for power generation and medical uses but not sufficient for producing weapons-grade nuclear fuel. Absent a negotiated agreement, Iran will continue with its program without constraints.



Mr. Netanyahu also denounced Iran’s Islamic regime and the danger it poses to Israel and to regional stability through its support for President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Shiite militias in Baghdad, rebels in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon.


Iran’s behavior is often threatening and reprehensible, and that is precisely why Mr. Obama has invested so much energy in trying to find a negotiated solution. But a major reason for Iran’s growing regional role is the American-led war that toppled Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which Mr. Netanyahu supported, although he was not prime minister at the time. Even after a nuclear agreement is signed, some sanctions connected to Iran’s missile and nuclear programs will remain in place.

Despite his commitment to negotiations, President Obama has repeatedly said he would never let Iran obtain a nuclear weapon and if an agreement is not honored, he would take action to back up his warning. Mr. Netanyahu obviously doesn’t trust him, which may be the most dangerous truth of this entire impasse.

The response in Congress suggested considerable opposition to a nuclear deal. But a new poll by the University of Maryland’s Program for Public Consultation and the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development shows that a clear majority of Americans — including 61 percent of Republicans and 66 percent of Democrats — favor an agreement.

Congress must not forget that its responsibility is to make choices that advance American security interests, and that would include a strict and achievable agreement with Iran. If it sabotages the deal as Mr. Netanyahu has demanded, it would bear the blame.