生長の家とは何だったのか？

大東亜戦争肯定論

http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1965/1101651008_400.jpg

Japan: Oh What a Lovely War?

10 08, 1965

The revelers in the Ginza cocktail lounge looked like any other gathering of Japanese junior executives: a bit soft around the middle, a bit busky-cheeked from golf and gin, affluent and amiable. The song they were singing sent a charge of shock through the bar: "Monday and Monday, Tuesday, Wed nesday, Thursday, Friday and Friday.". It was a battle song of the Japanese Imperial Navy, extolling daily dedication to the glory of Nippon. As the singing died away, the men spontaneously turned to reminiscences of Rabaul and Savo Island, Bataan and Okinawa. "Wasn't it great," said one, "those days in the war?"

 reveler：飲み騒ぐ人

cocktail lounge：カクテルラウンジ

busky-cheeked：buskyなほおをした

amiable：愛想のよい

extoll：激賞する、賞賛する

"Glorious Records." Nearly a generation after her crushing defeat in World War II, Japan is experiencing a wave of nostalgia for "the Pacific War." Every Sunday at 9 a.m., tots around the country gather before the TV to watch "Zero Fighter Hayato" knock a dozen American P-38s or Wildcats from the skies. Plastic-model Zero fighters and picture books are bestsellers from Hokkaido to Kyushu, while adults are now reading a book called Glorious Records, which praises the wartime Burma-Siam railway project that built the bridge over the River Kwai. A new series of junior high school history textbooks, approved by the Ministry of Education, implies that the blame for World War II lay not so much with Japanese aggression but with economic pressure exerted against Japan by "the ABCD Ring" (America, Britain, China and the Dutch). General Hideki Tojo, who coined the wartime ABCD rationale in the first place, is no longer pictured in the textbooks as a militarist on trial in a war crimes courtroom but as a kindly gent patting the heads of children.

tot：幼児、子供

coin：作り出す

rationale：理論的根拠

gent：紳士

Nowhere has the attempt to justify Japan's role in World War II been argued more vehemently than in the prestigious intellectual monthly Chuo Koron (circ. 180,000), which recently concluded a 16-part series by Novelist Fusao Hayashi. Tojo's execution as a war criminal, argues Hayashi, was part of a "ritualized vendetta" that began with Roosevelt's attempts to draw Japan into war. By terminating the U.S.-Japanese treaty of commerce in 1939, and then putting an embargo on petroleum exports to Japan, Roosevelt left Tokyo with "no alternative but to move south for resources to Indonesia." Japan, writes Hayashi, was justified in attacking Pearl Harbor out of self-defense. "How was it possible," he asks, "to maintain peace and order when one guy takes away food from the other and strangles his neck?"

vehemently：熱烈に、

prestigious：名声のある

vendetta：復讐、報復

Western observers see the new Japanese justification of the Pacific war as a logical outgrowth of the country's search for national identity. As the world's fifth-ranking industrial power and Asia's wealthiest nation, Japan feels a need to reassert itself in Asian affairs. Tokyo University Political Scientist Masao Maruyama suggests that the war in Viet Nam—which pits Asians against whites—tends to reinforce Japanese views that the Pacific war was justifiable as an "anti-colonial" and anti-white crusade. 

outgrowth：自然の成り行き、結果、派生物

pit：競争させる、対抗できる

reinforce：強化する

Several prominent newspapers have taken issue with the trend toward glorification of war, and the September issue of Chuo Koron is filled with rebuttals of Hayashi's series. The rebuttals point out the fatuity of Hayashi's attempt to "revive the old glories of the Japanese Empire," and detect in the pro-war sentiments a Japanese sense of mission for the "liberation" of Asia from Western colonialism, and a sense of superiority over other Asians.

take issue with ：・・・・と論争する、意見が対立する

rebuttal：反駁

fatuity： 愚かさ

One obvious—but as yet undeveloped —corollary to the new logic is the need for a militarily strong Japan. That, of course, is forbidden by the Japanese constitution. Former Premier Nobusuke Kishi, writing in October's Foreign Affairs, argues that the constitution should be revised to permit a full-scale defense force. Only thus, he maintains, will the Japanese "regain their self-confidence and pride." Kishi's brother, Premier Eisaku Sato, does not go quite that far, but with the pressure for rearmament slowly building, he may yet demand a constitutional amendment. "The true rehabilitation of Japan will begin at this point," writes Kishi. "Japan cannot be said to have found itself as a nation just because everyone has a TV set, plenty to eat and a higher income."

corollary ：必然的結果

ポツダム宣言

http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1945/1101450806_400.jpg

http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19450806,00.html

Unconditional surrender—the victory theme of the U.S. and her Allies since 1943—was replaced last week by a more daring formula for ending the war with Japan. 

Loser's Choice. From Potsdam to Tokyo went a declaration (by the U.S., Britain and China) offering concrete, unalterable terms upon which Japan could end the war. The phrase "unconditional surrender" was still used. But it applied only to the armies in the field. The terms were for the nation. Their gist: 

¶ Defeated Japan could have industries, but not a war industry. 

¶ She could have a government, but not a government of militarists.

¶ She could have a home—the four main islands, and such little ones as the Allies might let her keep—but not a Greater East Asia. 

On some critical points the Potsdam declaration was deliberately incomplete: 

¶ The occupation of Japan need not follow the German pattern. But the declaration's promises to limit occupation to "points designated by the Allies" obviously could mean anything: Tokyo alone, or every city and hamlet in Japan. The significant provisions were that 1) there would be an occupation; 2) it would end as soon as Japan had effectively disarmed and had established a peaceful government. 

¶ All mention of the Emperor was omitted, possibly because the Allies are still debating what to do with him; possibly to suggest that his fate and that of the peculiar institution he represents will depend on how the throne's influence is exerted now. 

With iron logic, the declaration also described the only alternative: invasion and "the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland." All in all, the terms added up to a hard peace but not to a ruthless one. In population, living standards, sovereignty and trade, the Japan they envisioned would not be inferior to the Japan of two generations ago. 

Decline of a Slogan. The declaration was the work of a Big Three meeting. But it was not a Big Three document. It was, above all, a U.S. document. 

Chiang Kai-shek read it in Chungking and approved it. Winston Churchill worked on it and signed it in Potsdam while he was still Prime Minister; Clement Attlee, prudently included in the early Potsdam meetings, approved it before he had any authority to sign it. Joseph Stalin, nominally neutral in the Pacific war, did not sign the declaration, but he undoubtedly gave it a look and a nod. 

The signature that really counted was that of President Harry S. Truman, successor to unconditional surrender's principal advocate. How had a U. S. President come to ditch the guiding war principle of another President? The story of unconditional surrender's rise and decline was one of the most meaningful stories of World War II. 

For Want of Another. Franklin Roosevelt proposed, and Winston Churchill reluctantly accepted, unconditional surrender as the Allies' one & only offer to the enemy when the United Nations were much less united than they later became. That was at Casablanca in January 1943. Even then the British felt that some less rigid approach to Germany might have paid.

 

But unconditional surrender served one all-important purpose: it spiked every German effort to divide Russia and the Western Allies. Furthermore, it was a handy and possibly a necessary substitute for specific aims and terms, at a time when the Allies had no common aims beyond defeating the enemy. 

Experience demonstrated that unconditional surrender had more meaning as a slogan than as a practical rule at the point of victory. Italy's surrender was based on specific conditions (still secret). Even Germany's surrender, when victors and losers got down to cases at Reims and Berlin, entailed some immediate terms. 

The Japanese war was heading for a similar conclusion: the Potsdam declaration set forth terms that are conditions of surrender. By the time the declaration appeared, unconditional surrender was more a habit of thought — or an excuse for avoiding thought — than anything else. 

The Schools. But finding a more subtle and promising device was easier said than done. On aims, and on basic, long-range strategy in the Pacific, two schools of diplomats and military men were fighting their own war in Washington. Until recently, the cleavage cut through both the State and Navy Departments. 

Group No. 1, which included many naval and foreign service officers with experience in Japan, argued that much of Japan's strength came from conquered areas on the Asiatic mainland and the southern islands. This school argued that invasion of Japan proper might be both costly and inconclusive; it would be better just to pull Japan's teeth by liberating the conquered areas, leave Japan alone. (The fringe of this group put their fears of a war with Russia ahead of the actual war with Japan, wanted to preserve a counterbalance.)

Group No. 2 argued that Japan, even if she were stripped down to the home islands, would still be the only integrated, industrialized nation in the hemisphere between the Rockies and the Himalayas capable of waging large-scale modern war. This school therefore insisted on the indefinite occupation of Japan, with complete deindustrialization and reorganization of Japanese society. (The fringe of this group wanted to kill 70,000,000 Japs.) 

Most of this debate raged in off-the-record secrecy, keeping the names of the disputants from both the Japs and the U.S. public. But a corollary of the argument was a public spectacle: the row over what to do with the Emperor. Undersecretary of State Joseph C. Grew, long the none-too-clairvoyant U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo, was indelibly identified in most people's minds as a keep-the-Emperor man (although he insisted that his view was not so simple). 

Grew's longtime confidant and former Embassy counselor, Eugene H. Dooman, was also in the thick of things and had long since been marked down in Washington as a soft-peace man. Just how the Grew-Dooman school had fared in the 

Potsdam declaration would not be known until the meaning of some of its vaguer phrases and omissions was cleared up. 

Rivers of History. A few weeks ago, the mental and political logjam broke. It was as though the rivers of history had suddenly come to full flood and converged on a single point: an opportunity to win the war completely, yet end it soon, existed and ought to be exploited. There was nothing to lose; much might be gained. The pace of the war and a clearer understanding of its meaning largely quieted the battle in Washington. 

Those who were dubious of invasion's costs and rewards realized that Japan was being as thoroughly softened as any modern power could be. Those who staked everything on the complete reduction of Japan realized that in any case the most significant development of the war had utterly changed the face of the Orient: the U.S. was already, and unquestionably would continue to be, a power in Asia and the far Pacific. 

In great force, the U.S. was permanently installed on islands just off the Japanese coasts, and East Asia could never again be a one-power area. China's development, and Russia's emergence in Asia, double-riveted this certainty. 

The press burst into a rash of reports that Japan had submitted definite peace proposals. The reports were denied. But, playing up the denials, the press often obscured the vital fact: Japanese officialdom was thinking of peace, discussing the possibilities, and seeing to it that this state of mind was made known to Washington, Moscow, London. 

Schools in Tokyo. A flood of information—some good, some bad—poured into Allied capitals from Tokyo. According to the best of these accounts, carefully conveyed to Washington (and probably to watchful Moscow) through "a neutral channel": 

¶ The principal advocates of peace were the Admirals without a navy. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, an old-school "kimono liberal" and new Navy Minister, was their logical spokesman. 

¶ The politicians in Premier Kantaro Suzuki's Cabinet, which is dominated by the military, could see ruin's approach as well as anyone, and they too wanted peace. But they either would not or could not bid for it on any terms conceivably acceptable to the U.S. 

¶ General Kuniaki Koiso's Army faction, still stronger than any other, was the principal (and potent) bar to actual peace overtures. With facts to back them up, the Army men reasoned that despite everything they still had at least 5,000,000 men wellarmed, undefeated, and prepared to fight to the very last. 

The First Reaction. Nobody expected the Japanese to answer "Yes" as soon as they saw the Potsdam terms. Truman's statesmanlike move was intended to recapture the political initiative, not to win the war in an afternoon. 

Highly significant was publication of the message in Japanese newspapers. Perhaps still more significant was the fact that the Jap Cabinet met for two hours at Premier Suzuki's home to discuss the Potsdam declaration. Said Premier Suzuki, belying his own words: "So far as the Imperial Government of Japan is concerned, it will take no notice of this proclamation." 

The professional extremist, General Jiro Minami, head of the Political Association of Great Japan, also found the Potsdam terms "exactly contrary" to what he wanted. He scorned the offer, admitted Japan might be beaten. 

But the seed had been planted. It could not be overlooked by such Big Business spokesmen as Munitions Minister Teijiro Toyoda, a Mitsui man. The Potsdam declaration invited him and his friends to take a practical look at what would be left of their properties if the homeland was invaded. 

Job for a Zombie? At the least, the declaration was bound to widen war fissures in Japanese life and politics, encourage the groups who want a peace of survival. 

Ken Murayama, a Japanese newsman recently captured in the Philippines, thought that Japan was ripe for surrender. He said that the man picked to arrange it was an almost forgotten political zombie, Admiral and former Premier Keisuke Okada. 

In the 1936 young officers' revolt, sake-swilling Okada saved his life by attending his own funeral. His brother-in-law, murdered by mistake, was buried as Okada, and assassins stopped looking for the Premier. Okada politely thanked all who sent condolences, resigned as Premier, returned to his sake and his chrysanthemums. 

Later, if not now, some Jap like Okada would have to emerge and show Japan the way to the end. That man might remind the Japanese of one of their proverbs: "To be beaten is to win."

神は死んだのか

http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1966/1101660408_400.jpg

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THEOLOGY Toward a Hidden God (See Cover)

 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19660408,00.html

Is God dead? It is a question that tantalizes both believers, who perhaps secretly fear that he is, and atheists, who possibly suspect that the answer is no. 

tantalize:じらす、じらして苦しめる

Is God dead? The three words represent a summons to reflect on the meaning of existence. No longer is the question the taunting jest of skeptics for whom unbelief is the test of wisdom and for whom Nietzsche is the prophet who gave the right answer a century ago. Even within Christianity, now confidently renewing itself in spirit as well as form, a small band of radical theologians has seriously argued that the churches must accept the fact of God's death, and get along without him. How does the issue differ from the age-old assertion that God does not and never did exist? Nietzsche's thesis was that striving, self-centered man had killed God, and that settled that. The current death-of-God group* believes that God is indeed absolutely dead, but proposes to carry on and write a theology without theos, without God. Less radical Christian thinkers hold that at the very least God in the image of man, God sitting in heaven, is dead, and—in the central task of religion today—they seek to imagine and define a God who can touch men's emotions and engage men's minds. 

summon：呼び出す、命令する

taunting：声に出してののしる

jest：冗談

thesis：論題、命題、

striving：努力する

If nothing else, the Christian atheists are waking the churches to the brutal reality that the basic premise of faith—the existence of a personal God, who created the world and sustains it with his love—is now subject to profound attack. "What is in question is God himself," warns German Theologian Heinz Zahrnt, "and the churches are fighting a hard defensive battle, fighting for every inch." "The basic theological problem today," says one thinker who has helped define it, Langdon Gilkey of the University of Chicago Divinity School, "is the reality of God."

A Time of No Religion.

Some Christians, of course, have long held that Nietzsche was not just a voice crying in the wilderness. Even before Nietzsche, SÖren Kierkegaard warned that "the day when Christianity and the world become friends, Christianity is done away with." During World War II, the anti-Nazi Lutheran martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote prophetically to a friend from his Berlin prison cell: "We are proceeding toward a time of no religion at all." 

do away with：・・・・を廃止する、殺す

For many, that time has arrived. Nearly one of every two men on earth lives in thralldom to a brand of totalitarianism that condemns religion as the opiate of the masses—which has stirred some to heroic defense of their faith but has also driven millions from any sense of God's existence. Millions more, in Africa, Asia and South America, seem destined to be born without any expectation of being summoned to the knowledge of the one God. 

thralldom：奴隷の身分、束縛

Princeton Theologian Paul Ramsey observes that "ours is the first attempt in recorded history to build a culture upon the premise that God is dead." In the traditional citadels of Christendom, grey Gothic cathedrals stand empty, mute witnesses to a rejected faith. From the scrofulous hobos of Samuel Beckett to Antonioni's tired-blooded aristocrats, the anti-heroes of modern art endlessly suggest that waiting for God is futile, since life is without meaning.

 premise：前提、根拠

citadel：城、とりで、拠り所

Christendom：全キリスト教徒

grey：灰色

mute：無言の

scrofulous

hobo：浮浪者、ルンペン

For some, this thought is a source of existential anguish: the Jew who lost his faith in a providential God at Auschwitz, the Simone de Beauvoir who writes:

"It was easier for me to think of a world without a creator than of a creator loaded with all the contradictions of the world." But for others, the God issue—including whether or not he is dead—has been put aside as irrelevant. "Personally, I've never been confronted with the question of God," says one such politely indifferent atheist, Dr. Claude Lévi-Strauss, professor of social anthropology at the Collège de France. "I find it's perfectly possible to spend my life knowing that we will never explain the universe." Jesuit Theologian John Courtney Murray points to another variety of unbelief: the atheism of distraction, people who are just "too damn busy" to worry about God at all. 

Johannine Spirit.

Yet, along with the new atheism has come a new reformation The open-window spirit of Pope John XXIII and Vatican II have re vitalized the Roman Catholic Church.

Less spectacularly but not less decisively, Protestantism has been stirred by a flurry of experimentation in liturgy, church structure, ministry. In this new Christianity, the watchword is witness: Protestant faith now means not intellectual acceptance of an ancient confession, but open commitment—perhaps best symbolized in the U.S. by the civil rights movement—to eradicating the evil and inequality that beset the world.

flurry：突風、動揺

experimentation：実験

liturgy：礼拝式

watchword：合言葉、標語

witness：目撃者、証人

confession：自白、告白、宗派

eradicate：根絶する

beset：包囲する、付きまとう

The institutional strength of the churches is nowhere more apparent than in the U.S., a country where public faith in God seems to be as secure as it was in medieval France. According to a survey by Pollster Lou Harris last year, 97% of the American people say they believe in God. Although clergymen agree that the postwar religious revival is over, a big majority of believers continue to display their faith by joining churches. In 1964, reports the National Council of Churches, denominational allegiance rose about 2%, compared with a population gain of less than 1.5%. More than 120 million Americans now claim a religious affiliation; and a recent Gallup survey indicated that 44% of them report that they attend church services weekly.

secure：安定した、確固とした

clergymen：聖職者

denominational：宗派の、教派の

allegiance：忠誠

affiliation：加入、提携、友好関係

For uncounted millions, faith remains as rock-solid as Gibraltar. Evangelist Billy Graham is one of them. "I know that God exists because of my personal experience," he says. "I know that I know him. I've talked with him and walked with him. He cares about me and acts in my everyday life." Still another is Roman Catholic Playwright William Alfred, whose off-Broadway hit, Hogan's Goat, melodramatically plots a turn-of-the-century Irish immigrant's struggle to achieve the American dream. "People who tell me there is no God," he says, "are like a six-year-old boy saying that there is no such thing as passionate love—they just haven't experienced it."

Practical Atheists.

Plenty of clergymen, nonetheless, have qualms about the quality and character of contemporary belief. Lutheran Church Historian Martin Marty argues that all too many pews are filled on Sunday with practical atheists—disguised nonbelievers who behave during the rest of the week as if God did not exist. Jesuit Murray qualifies his conviction that the U.S. is basically a God-fearing nation by adding: "The great American proposition is 'religion is good for the kids, though I'm not religious myself.' " Pollster Harris bears him out: of the 97% who said they believed in God, only 27% declared themselves deeply religious.

qualm：良心のとがめ、不安、疑念

 pew：信徒席

qualify：資格を与える、述べる、

proposition：主張、計画、提案

bear out：裏つける

Christianity and Judaism have always had more than their share of men of little faith or none. "The fool says in his heart, 'there is no God,' " wrote the Psalmist, implying that there were plenty of such fools to be found in ancient Judea. But it is not faintness of spirit that the churches worry about now: it is doubt and bewilderment assailing committed believers.

Psalmist：賛美歌作者

faintness：失神状態

bewilderment：当惑、うろたえ

assail：攻撃する

Particularly among the young, there is an acute feeling that the churches on Sunday are preaching the existence of a God who is nowhere visible in their daily lives. "I love God," cries one anguished teenager, "but I hate the church." Theologian Gilkey says that "belief is the area in the modern Protestant church where one finds blankness, silence, people not knowing what to say or merely repeating what their preachers say." Part of the Christian mood today, suggests Christian Atheist William Hamilton, is that faith has become not a possession but a hope.

blankness：空白がある状態

Anonymous Christianity. In search of meaning, some believers have desperately turned to psychiatry, Zen or drugs. Thousands of others have quietly abandoned all but token allegiance to the churches, surrendering themselves to a life of "anonymous Christianity" dedicated to civil rights or the Peace Corps. Speaking for a generation of young Roman Catholics for whom the dogmas of the church have lost much of their power, Philosopher Michael Novak of Stanford writes: "I do not understand God, nor the way in which he works. If, occasionally, I raise my heart in prayer, it is to no God I can see, or hear, or feel. It is to a God in as cold and obscure a polar night as any non-believer has known." 

シャルリ・エブドテロ事件タイム誌の特集記事を読む

Charlie Hebdo, Before the Paris Terror Shooting Attack | Op-Docs | The New York Times

 

 

今回のタイム誌のカバストリは、やはり、パリテロ事件を取り上げています。

最近のタイムはどうも以前と比べて、分量も減っていますし、なんだか、質も落ちているような気がして、熱心な読者ではないんですが、今回は、かなり気合が入っているみたいで、ていねいに読んでみようと思います。

The terrorist attacks in Paris have left the West searching for ways to defeat a patient, adaptable enemy


 The slaughter of 17 people in the City of Light in early January was, sad to say, not particularly bloody by the gruesome standards of radical Islamist terrorism. Paris was not even the deadliest scene of the week, which saw up to 2,000 people massacred in Nigeria by the militants of Boko Haram and nearly 40 people killed by what was likely an al-Qaeda car bomb in the capital of Yemen.

 gruesome：ぞっとする、身の毛のよだつような

今回のパリのテロは、イスラム過激派の陰惨な過去の水準から比べて、そんなに特別視するほどのものでもない、というのですが、まあ、確かに、そうですね。皮肉っぽい書き方ですが、その通りでしょう。

 

But there was something deeply ominous about Paris, and profoundly discouraging. The attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo–and the related killings in a kosher supermarket and on a city street–wove together so many strands of Western failure. The killers were just three among thousands of European Muslims tempted by jihad, some of whom have traveled to the chaotic lands of the Middle East for training in terrorist tactics. Watch-listed by Western intelligence agencies, they simply outlasted the resources and attention span of French authorities. Their targets–a Jewish market and a magazine that didn’t hesitate to offend the pious–were known to be in danger.

ominous：不吉な、

profoundly：深く、大いに discouraging：落胆させる、気がめいるような

weave：〔+目的語+together〕〈…を〉織り[編み]合わせる

strand：子なわ、要素

outlast：長持ちする、長く続く

今回のテロは、「量的」には、そんなに大したものではないかも知れないが、「質的」には、「deeply ominous」で「profoundly discouraging」というのですね、この記事の筆者によれば。

今回のテロリストたちは、フランス当局の警戒にもかかわらず、その警戒網をやすやすとかいくぐってしまった。今回のような過激思想のテロリスト予備軍はフランスをはじめ、ヨロッパ各地にたくさん存在していることを考えると、今回のテロは不吉極まりない事件だとするこの記事のライタの意見はなるほどと思えますね。

And still the terrorists got through. Two of them were dispatched by the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the group claimed, saying the attack came on the order of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the successor to Osama bin Laden. A third killer said he was sent by the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), the throat-cutting militia that emerged in Iraq and flourished in war-torn Syria.

In short, the West, so wealthy and powerful, was whipped in Paris by enemies it has been fighting for years as part of a war that has not ended. And experts warn of more–perhaps worse–to come. The head of Britain’s domestic intelligence service, Andrew Parker, said in a rare public speech that “a group of core al-Qaeda terrorists in Syria is planning mass-casualty attacks against the West.” He called an attack in the U.K. “highly likely.” French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, meanwhile, put 10,000 soldiers and 5,000 police officers on protective duty around vulnerable sites, especially the schools and synagogues of France’s traumatized Jewish community. In Washington, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson announced stepped-up security measures at airports, government buildings and critical infrastructure targets.

whip：むち打つ、勝つ、打ち負かす

つまるところ、豊かで、資金もある西欧が、今回、自国内に住んでいるイスラムテロリストに負けた、ということだ、というのですね。

今回のテロ事件が解決しても、これからも、まだまだ、もっともっと大きなテロ事件が起きる可能性があるというのですね。

 

  Nearly two decades after the little-known bin Laden declared war on the U.S., violent jihadists are active from the Taliban strongholds of northern Pakistan to the shores of Africa’s Lake Chad and beyond. Once hounded from one outlaw sanctuary to another, they now control territory, or move freely, in at least half a dozen countries. The jihadists have captured arsenals, seized oil fields and emptied bank vaults. They publish online magazines and maintain Twitter accounts–while hacking their adversaries’. On Jan. 12, ISIS supporters briefly took control of the Twitter feed belonging to the U.S. military’s Central Command. ISIS has its own national anthem.

stronghold：要塞、拠点、根拠地

shore：岸、海岸、陸地、国

hound：追跡する、追いまわす

outlaw：無法者 　sanctuary：聖域、避難所

arsenal：兵器庫　　vault：貯蔵室、金庫室

adversarｙ：敵

 

 AQAP boasts a propaganda superstar: the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who once pronounced jihad to be “as American as apple pie.” His fluent video sermons continue to inspire militants–the Paris gunmen likely among them–years after his death in a U.S. drone strike. Robert Grenier, in a new book about his service at the top of the CIA’s counterterrorism efforts, sums it up simply: “The forces of global jihad which Osama bin Laden did so much to inspire are stronger than ever.”

boast：自慢する、誇る

cleric：聖職者

pronounce：宣言する、公言する

as American as apple pie：きわめてアメリカ的な

 

And their tactics are evolving. The assault on the offices of Charlie Hebdo–in which gunmen cooperated in military style to overcome police security and carry out a series of assassinations–was a far cry from the sadly familiar business of smuggled bombs, suicide missions and lone gunmen targeting Jews. It bore some of the trappings of the 2008 shooting and bombing attacks in Mumbai by the radical Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which killed 166 people. As thousands of European Muslims answer the call to jihad in Syria and Iraq, then return home as experienced guerrilla fighters, Europe can expect to see more of this.

a far cry:予測はずれ

bear：・・・を生む、身に着ける

trapping：罠賭け、補足

 

 

田中角栄 五つの大切・十の反省

 

■田中角栄 五つの大切・十の反省 
  

田中角栄が首相在任中に打ち出した児童教育指針。

「五つの大切」

The Five Principles

１ 人間を大切にしよう

1. Let's cherish people.

２ 自然を大切にしょう

2. Let's cherish nature.

３ 3.時間を大切にしよう

3. Let's cherish time.

４ モノを大切にしよう

4. Let's cherish things.

５ 社会を大切にしよう

5. Let's cherish our country and society.

「十の反省」
The Ten Subjects for Reflection: 

１ 友達と仲良くしただろうか

1. Have I been friendly to my playmates?

２ お年よりに親切だったろうか

2. Have I been kind to elderly people? 

３ 弱いものいじめをしなかったろうか

3. Have I bullied the weak?

４ 生き物や草花を大事にしただろうか

4. Have I taken care of all living creatures, flowers and plants?

５ 約束は守っただろうか

5. Have I kept my promises?

６ 交通ルールは守っただろうか

6. Have I observed all traffic regulations?

７ 親や先生など、ひとの意見をよく聞いただろうか

7. Have I listened to the advice of others, such as my parents and teachers?

８ 食べ物に好き嫌いを言わなかっただろうか

8. Have I been finicky with my food?

９ ひとに迷惑をかけなかっただろうか

9. Have I been a nuisance to others?

１０ 正しいことに勇気をもって行動しただろうか

10. Have I acted courageously for what I believed to be right?