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NTSB UPDATE ON THE MINNEAPOLIS BRIDGE FAILURE ANALYSIS¡Ê£±¡¿£³¡Ë
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¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡By Charles C. Roberts, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.

On January 15, 2008 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released an interim finding regarding the failure analysis of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis.
2008ǯ1·î15ÆüÊÆ¹ñ²È±¿Í¢°ÂÁ´°Ñ°÷²ñ¡ÊNTSB¡Ë¤Ï¡¢¥ß¥Í¥¢¥Ý¥ê¥¹¤Î£É¡Ý£³£µ£×¶¶¤Î¸Î¾ã²òÀϤˤĤ¤¤Æ¡¢»ÃÄêŪ¤Ê½ê¸«¤òȯɽ¤·¤¿¡£

According to the report (1), investigators found that certain gusset plates that connect bridge structural members were under-designed according to American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) ¡ÈStandard Specifications for Highway Bridges,¡É
¥ì¥Ý¡¼¥È¡Ê1¡Ë¤Ë¤è¤ë¤È¡¢Áܺº²¼¤Ë¤¢¤Ã¤¿¤ËÀ߷פµ¤ì¤¿Êƹñ½£Æ»Ï©Åö¶É¡ÊAASHO¡Ë¤Îµ¬Äꤹ¤ë¡Ö¹â®ƻϩ¶¶É¸½à»ÅÍ͡פ˽àµò¤¹¤ì¤Ð¡¢Åö³º¶¶¤Î¹½Â¤Éôºà¤ÎÀܳ¤ËÍѤ¤¤é¤ì¤¿´ö¤Ä¤«¤Î¥¬¥»¥Ã¥È¥×¥ì¡¼¥È¤¬²á¾®À߷פǤ¢¤Ã¤¿»ö¤ò»ØÅ¦¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡£

This resulted in several gusset plates installed with a ½ inch thickness instead of some larger thickness.
¤³¤ì¤Ï¡¢¤¤¤¯¤Ä¤«¤Î¥¬¥»¥Ã¥È¥×¥ì¡¼¥È¤¬ËÜÍè¤â¤Ã¤È¸ü¤ß¤Î¤¢¤ë¤Ù¤­¤â¤Î¤¬½¥¤¥ó¥Á¤Î¸ü¤µ¤Çº®ºß¤·¤Æ¤¤¤¿·ë²Ì¤À¤È·ëÏÀ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡£

Although the NTSB indicated that this was a design error, the chairman indicated that the federal probe into the bridge collapse is by no means final and that the cause has yet to be found.
£Î£Ô£Ó£Â¤¬¡¢¤³¤ì¤ÏÀ߷ץߥ¹¤À¤ÈÀâÌÀ¤·¤¿¤Ë¤·¤Æ¤â¡¢Æ±°Ñ°÷Ĺ¤Ï¡¢¶¶¤ÎÊø²õ¤Ø¤ÎϢˮÀ¯ÉܤÎÄ´ºº¤ÎºÇ½ªÅª¤È¤¤¤¦°ÕÌ£¤Ç¤Ï¡¢¸¶°ø¤Ï¤Þ¤Àȯ¸«¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤Ê¤¤¤³¤È¤ò¼¨º¶¤·¤¿¡£

Figure 1 is a view of the bridge showing gusset plates U10 and L11, which the NTSB found to be the most severe violators of the AASHO standard and most deficiently designed.
¿Þ1¤Ï¡¢Åö³º¶¶Î¤ÎU10ÍѤÈL11¥¬¥»¥Ã¥È¤ò¼¨¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤¬¡¢¤³¤ì¤¬AASHOɸ½à¤Ë¾È¤é¤·¤ÆºÇ¤â¿¼¹ï¤Ê´ð½àÈãȽ¤ÇºÇ¤âÉÔ´°Á´¤Ê¥¬¥»¥Ã¥È¥×¥ì¡¼¥È¤Î°ÌÃÖ¤ò¼¨¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡£
¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡https://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/IMG/ybi/1/a7/6e/srfch485/folder/1508733/img_1508733_58558473_0?1250528602
¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡Figure 1
Figure 2 shows the approximate location of these plates in a post failure photograph.
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¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡https://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/IMG/ybi/1/a7/6e/srfch485/folder/1508733/img_1508733_58558473_1?1250528782
¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡Figure 2

It was also mentioned that approximately 300 tons of construction equipment was located over gusset plates U10 and U11 in the southbound lanes (green area Figure 1).
¤Þ¤¿¡¢Ìó300¥È¥ó¤Î·úÀßµ¡³£¤¬»ö¸ÎÅö»þ¡¢²¼¤ê¼ÖÀþ¤ÎU10ÍѤª¤è¤ÓU11¤Î¥¬¥»¥Ã¥È¡¦¥×¥ì¡¼¥È¤ÎÉÕ¶á¡ÊÎФΥ¨¥ê¥¢¤ò¿Þ1¤Ë°ÌÃÖ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤¿¡Ë¤ËÀßÃÖ¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤¿¤³¤È¤â¸ÀµÚ¤µ¤ì¤¿¡£

According to the NTSB, all 16 of the under-designed gusset plates were found to be fractured while the remaining were typically intact.
NTSB¤Ë¤è¤ë¤È¡¢²á¾®À߷פǤ¢¤Ã¤¿£±£¶¸Ä¤Î¥¬¥»¥Ã¥È¥×¥ì¡¼¥È¤¬Êø²õ¤·¡¢»Ä¤ê¤Ï¡¢Ä̾ï¤Ï¤½¤Î¤Þ¤Þ¤À¤Ã¤¿¤³¤È¤¬È½ÌÀ¤·¤¿¡£

The original design calculations made by the bridge designers (Sverdrup and Parcel) could not be found.
Åö³º¶¶Î¤νé´üÀß·×»þ¤Ëºî¤é¤ì¤¿(Sverdrup and Parcel¼Ò¤Î)¹½Â¤·×»»½ñ¤Ï¸«¤Ä¤«¤é¤Ê¤¤¤À¤í¤¦¡£

Accordingly, the NTSB could not determine how the apparent calculation error occurred. No deficiencies were found in the steel or concrete that could have caused a failure.
¤·¤¿¤¬¤Ã¤Æ¡¢NTSB¤Ï¤³¤ÎÊø²õ»ö¸Î¤ò¤â¤¿¤é¤·¤¿ÌÀ¤é¤«¤Ê·×»»¥ß¥¹¤¬¤Ê¤µ¤ì¤¿¤Î¤«¤òÃÇÄê¤Ç¤­¤Ê¤¤¤À¤í¤¦¡£¤Þ¤¿¹Ýºà¤ä¥³¥ó¥¯¥ê¡¼¥È¤Ë·ç´Ù¤Ç¤³¤ÎÊø²õ¤¬µ¯¤³¤Ã¤¿²ÄǽÀ­¤â¸«½Ð¤¹¤³¤È¤â¤Ç¤­¤Ê¤¤¤À¤í¤¦¡£

The I-35W bridge was designed before 1964 and was completed in 1967 with additional dead (weight) loads added over time (1977 and 1998), which included a median barrier, larger outside walls and increased thickness of the concrete deck.
I - 35W¶¶¤Ï1964ǯÁ°¤ËÀ߷פµ¤ì¡¢1967ǯ¤Ë½×¹©¤·¤¿¤¬¡¢¸åǯ¡Ê1977ǯ¡Á1998ǯ¡Ë¤¿¤Ó½Å¤Í¤ÆÄɲäθÇÄê²Ù½Å¡Ê¼«½Å¡Ë¤¬²Ã¤¨¤é¤ì¡¢²Ù½Å¤ÎÁý²Ã¤¬»þ´Ö¤Î·Ð²á¤Ë½¾¤Ã¤ÆÅö³º¶¶Î¤ËÄɲ䵤줿¤³¤È¤Ë¤Ê¤ë¡£¶ñÂÎŪ¤Ë¤Ï¾²ÈǤä¦Êɤθü¤µ¤¬²Ù½Å¤ÎÁý²Ã¤Ë´Þ¤Þ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡£

According to the NTSB, this added significantly to the weight of the structure.
NTSB¤Ë¤è¤ë¤È¡¢¤³¤ì¤é¤Î²ó¼ý¤ÏÂçÉý¤Ë¹½Â¤ÂΤνÅÎ̤ËÄɲä·¤¿¤³¤È¤Ë¤Ê¤ë¡£

No bridge design analyses could be found regarding the acceptability of the additional dead loads.
Åö³º¶¶Î¤θÇÄê²Ù½Å¤ÎÁý²Ã¤¬µöÍÆÈϰϤǤ¢¤Ã¤¿¤«¤É¤¦¤«¤Î²òÀÏ·ë²Ì¤â¸«¤Ä¤«¤Ã¤Æ¤¤¤Ê¤¤¡£

At the close of the news conference, the NTSB emphasized that the investigation continues.
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